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I. INTRODUCTION
Czesław Znamierowski belonged to a small group of Polish intellectuals 
who, during the period before the First World War, exhibited regular, albeit 
selective, interest in American Pragmatism.1 Particular interest in this philo-
sophical movement emerged after William James had published Pragmatism 
in 1907.2 Znamierowski’s doctoral dissertation, entitled Der Wahrheitsbegriff 
im Pragmatismus (On the Concept of Truth in Pragmatism)3, defended at Basel 
University in 1911, was associated with an intensive search for his own path in 
science, as evidenced by the recollections he shared with Zygmunt Ziembiński.4 
This article presents the key ideas of this first serious academic work of the 
founder of Poznań school of theory and philosophy of law – as yet not discussed 
in the literature – and the impact it had on some of his later ideas.
The objective of Znamierowski’s dissertation was to put forward an analys- 
is of pragmatism, based on the assumption that a key component of this 
doctrine is a specific concept of truth. It is difficult to say whether he was fa-
miliar with Max Meyer’s opinion that there are as many pragmatisms as there 
are pragmatists.5 Suffice it to say that Znamierowski decided to treat various 
pragmatists, despite their differing stances, as representing one philosophic- 
al movement, which probably even at that stage was not entirely legitimate, 
given the fundamental differences in the views of the creator of pragmatism – 
Peirce, whose work Znamierowski was not familiar with – and the most fam- 
ous pragmatists of the time, such as James, Dewey and Schiller, who are 
extensively cited in his work.
1 In addition to Znamierowski, Florian Znaniecki, Stanisław Brzozowski and Władysław Bie-
gański also deserve mention. See Buczyńska-Garewicz (1973): 47–48. This group also includes the 
translator of James’s works into Polish, Władysław M. Kozłowski.
2 James (1907). It should be noted that the Polish, extended, translation by W.M. Kozłow-
ski – Pragmatyzm. Dylemat determinizmu – appeared in Warsaw as early as 1911.
3 Znamierowski (1912). Subsequently in the text referred to as Wahrheitsbegriff.
4 See Ziembiński (1968): 302.
5 Meyer (1908): 326.
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According to Znamierowski, the main feature of the pragmatist concept of 
truth is an anti-intellectualism which he identifies with ‘Platonism’ and labels 
as such. In Znamierowski’s view, this anti-intellectualism fails to grasp the 
teleological and instrumental character of concepts. Such is the case with the 
correspondence theory of truth (in the versions known to him in 1912). This 
does not mean that Znamierowski is on the side of intellectualism, which he 
accuses primarily of the illegitimate transformation (Verdoppelung, Umbil-
dung) of reality into knowledge.6 In his opinion, James adopts a theory of cor-
respondence provisionally, although he rejects its transcendent assumptions.
Znamierowski sees a characteristic feature of James’s pragmatism as be-
ing an attempt to replace the static intellectualist relationship between real- 
ity and truth with a dynamic account, subordinated to the function of thinking, 
which at the same time makes it a normative approach, guided by a task set 
from an external perspective.7 Thus, pragmatism sought to propose a concep-
tion of truth dependent on the consequences deemed desirable by the author 
of true judgments. James’s support for a close relationship between cognition 
and practical action is indisputable.8 The pragmatist concept of truth is also 
usually characterized as being based on the criterion of utility.9
II. LOGIC AND PSYCHOLOGY IN WAHRHEITSBEGRIFF
Znamierowski’s criticism of the pragmatist theory of truth primarily ad-
dresses the claim of the pragmatists that their theory is a logical theory of 
truth. It is not surprising today that pragmatist reflections on truth, including 
the truth-value of sentences, characterizes the pragmatist position on logic. 
From a historical perspective, however, one has to bear in mind that what was 
at stake in these findings was greater than it might seem today. In the con-
text of the debate on science and philosophy at the turn of the nineteenth and 
twentieth century, the issues of logic and psychology were of paramount im-
portance. First, the autonomy of philosophy was thought to depend on a stand 
being taken on these issues. Characteristic features of German philosophical 
reflection in the second half of the nineteenth century were the interest in 
a psychological interpretation of philosophical issues related to the develop-
ment of natural sciences and the abandonment of idealism in philosophy. In 
the scientific psychology of that period, sense data were brought to the fore-
front, as something that could be empirically examined, and mental life was 
treated as reflecting those data. Those German philosophers decided that by 
investigating something non-material, and yet existing in some mode, they 
6 See Znamierowski (1912): 7.
7 Znamierowski (1912: 9): ‘Diese teleologische Voraussetzung legt es nahe, das Denken unter 
den Gesichtspunkt der Norm nicht durch Untersuchung seiner inneren Struktur, sondern durch 
die Erwägung der ihm äusserlich zukommenden Aufgabe zu bringen.’
8 See Buczyńska-Garewicz (1970): 5–16.
9 See Kołakowski (2000): 50.
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would be dealing with the psychical, and thus they stood a chance of com-
ing close to psychologism in philosophy.10 Second, the understanding of logic 
was thought to depend on determining its relationship with psychology. Psy-
chologism, based on reductionist assumptions, such as that any problem can 
be ultimately explained in psychological terms, was also extended to logic, 
understood as the science of cognitive processes, often inspired by works of 
J.S. Mill. Psychologism in logic was criticized by such thinkers as Frege, 
Husserl, Łukasiewicz; with the latter claiming that logic consists of logical 
truths having their proper locus in deductive systems, rather than in empiric- 
al laws describing how we actually think.11
In order to determine the relation of logic to psychology, Znamierowski ex-
amines F.C.S. Schiller’s views as representative, in his opinion, of pragmatism 
in general. Although Znamierowski shares his criticism of the ‘psychologis-
tic-descriptive’ logic characteristic of intellectualism, this does not remove the 
odium of criticism from pragmatism which, as a kind of psychologism, focuses 
on actual cognitive acts.12 Znamierowski refutes Schiller’s psychologistic-nor-
mative approach to logic which uses truth as a category of valuation (Wertkat-
egorie), on the grounds that valuation (Wertung) and validity (Geltung) in logic 
are independent of psychological facts.13 Although Znamierowski’s critique of 
psychologism in the account of logic is not a positive program, his arguments 
imply that he favours recognizing logic as an autonomous theoretical science. 
According to Znamierowski, criticism of Schiller’s position provides addition-
al arguments for the autonomy of logic in relation to psychology. He refers 
to Schiller’s claim that psychologistic logic copes better than other approach-
es with the problem of errors, since formal logic focuses on true sentences. 
Znamierowski believes that errors belong to the history of knowledge, not to 
logic,14 which in turn makes it possible to attribute to him the view that logic 
is a formal and a priori science. In his criticism of psychologism, Znamierow- 
ski also refers to some views of Husserl, from whom he inherits the idea that 
although thinking is carried out and implemented in our consciousness, and 
even though it is a condition of understanding what consciousness is, it does 
not follow that the truth-value of a logical proposition depends on one’s psy-
chological situation or that logic depends on psychology.15 Husserl’s research 
on consciousness is discernibly different from the empirical psychology of that 
era because in his phenomenology of consciousness, epistemological issues (for 
example, transcendence of objects with respect to consciousness, the mode of 
existence of the subject of cognition, the existence of indubitable data) are 
of primary concern.16 It is worth emphasizing this Husserlian thread in the 
10 See Ingarden (1963): 273–276.
11 For more on criticism of psychologism in logic, see Tworak (1996). Note, however, that Mill 
also provided logic with a prescriptive function. See Godden (2005).
12 See Znamierowski (1912): 13–14.
13 See Znamierowski (1912): 20.
14 See Znamierowski (1912): 24.
15 See Znamierowski (1912): 23.
16 See Judycki (1993): 34–35.
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first part of Wahrheitsbegriff, because nowadays, mainly due to the work of 
Lorini and Żełaniec,17 one better understands the impact of phenomenology on 
Znamierowski’s social ontology, but attention is typically paid to mediating his 
contact with Husserl’s phenomenology through the work of Adolf Reinach.18
Znamierowski’s dissertation also returns to problems related to the sta-
tus of logic and its theorems, starting from the observation that axioms and 
self-evident truths are seen by pragmatists as historically variable statements 
or postulates.19 According to Znamierowski, logical claims preserve their val- 
idity regardless of doubts related to their origin or to the disputes regarding 
their justification, in particular among adherents of psychologism and anti- 
-psychologism.20
Znamierowski critically recalls Alfred Sidgwick’s attempts to apply logic to 
informal reasoning and his attempts to defend John McTaggart’s approach 
to the principle of contradiction, based on a pragmatic distinction between 
sentences as such and sentences whose validity depends on the context of 
use. He notices the analogy between Sidgwick’s views21 and the ideas of 
Schiller22 who deals, among other things, with the principle of identity. 
Schiller rejects apriorism and transcendental necessity as the source of this 
principle, arguing that, on the basis of directly felt individual identity, we 
postulate the identity of objects and meanings as expressions of our desire.23 
He also recalls Schiller’s view that ‘the meaning of a rule lies in its appli-
cation’, and therefore a fortiori ‘that the truth of an assertion depends on 
its application’.24 Znamierowski rejects this view, which is Wittgensteinian 
avant la lettre if stripped of its psychological and biological assumptions. 
Adopting this view would presuppose that a sentence is meaningless before 
being used, but this assumption cannot, in Znamierowski’s opinion, be rec-
onciled with the need to understand the sentence by its user.25 In Wahrheits-
begriff either he implicitly assumes the direct understanding of a sentence – 
because any other understanding includes, even potentially, the context of 
its use, or ignores the fact that, despite the ambiguity of his argument, he 
does not write about sentences, but about assertions. Apart from this issue, 
Znamierowski wanted to defend the demarcation line (Abgrenzung) between 
the logic and science of his time.26
17 See e.g. Lorini, Żełaniec (1916).
18 See Lorini, Żełaniec (1916): 77. Similarly Czepita (1988): 20, note 23.
19 See Znamierowski (1912): 76–77.
20 See Znamierowski (1912): 78.
21 Sidgwick (1905).
22 Schiller (1902): 51.
23 See Schiller (1902): 95–98.
24 Schiller (1905): 237.
25 Znamierowski (1912: 82): ‘Dass diese Theorie der Bedeutung unhaltbar ist, leuchtet voll- 
ständig ein. Ihr gemäss ist der Satz bedeutungslos, ehe er angewandt wird. Und wie kann er 
angewandt werden, ohne verstanden zu sein? Kann man etwas als Werkzeug gebrauchen, wovon 
man absolut nichts weiss?’
26 See Znamierowski (1912): 83.
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III. ON THE SO-CALLED ANTI-PSYCHOLOGISM 
IN ZNAMIEROWSKI’S THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
Znamierowski’s considerations on the relation of logic to psychology in 
Wahrheitsbegriff remained an important part of his scientific attitude. In 
1922, he defended his doctoral dissertation in law at Poznań University. Psy-
chologistic Theory of Law. Critical Analysis27 was partly his polemic against 
Leon Petrazhitskii’s conception of law. Some commentators raise doubts as 
to the legitimacy of its main polemical thread28, and even suggest that it 
contributed to Petrazhitskii’s ‘persecution’.29 They seem oblivious, however, 
of the fact that Znamierowski’s considerations largely concern his own social 
ontology, already developing at that time, in which he included the theory 
of law.30
Attaching the label of anti-psychologism to Znamierowski’s theory and 
philosophy of law runs the risk of oversimplification, reinforced by the sugges-
tion that he followed primarily a negative research program. Meanwhile, his 
version of anti-psychologism, partly originating in Wahrheitsbegriff, produced 
at least two important positive insights in his theory and philosophy of law.
The first anti-psychologistic insight in Znamierowski’s account of law 
reflects his lasting belief in the autonomy of logic with regard to psychology. 
This belief would often return in his legal-theoretical views. By way of ex-
ample, two important philosophical theses related to this issue were shaped 
in his polemic against pragmatism and directly translated into some later 
views.
Znamierowski’s first thesis concerns the independence of the truth-value 
of statements from the acts of their use. The problem which vexed Znamierow- 
ski in Wahrheitsbegriff, namely that of the absolute truth-value of sentences, 
independent of the acts of using them, and presented in the criticism of the 
pragmatist approach to axioms, found a clear transposition on his view of 
the truth-value of norms as sentences in a logical sense. In his 1924 book, he 
stated with regard to any thetic norm (which he considered to be a sentence, 
whose truth-value and validity depend on the act of enacting it31), that ‘its 
validity does not extend in time as far as its truthfulness does’.32 Considering, 
27 Znamierowski (1925).
28 See Barwicka-Tylek (2010): 49.
29 ‘Znamierowski defended a doctoral dissertation in 1922 entitled “Psychological Theory of 
Law. Critical Analysis”, in which, given his knowledge of the Russian and German languages, 
he assembled all the critical observations, even caricatures and unjust ones, advanced against 
Petrazhitskii’s doctrine. Znamierowski secured, so to speak, the theoretical base for persecutors 
and persons envious of Petrazhitskii, Merezhko (2012).
30 See Znamierowski (1925): 7.
31 Ziembiński explains that for Znamierowski a norm was a sentence in a logical sense due to 
the information included in its content as according to whose evaluations or because of whose act 
of enactment it should be so and so. See Ziembiński (1963): 90. A more elementary outline of this 
conception, see Ziembiński (1976): 126–175.
32 Znamierowski (1934): 36, 200 (note 8).
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though without ultimately prejudging the question of the truth-value of the 
thetic norm before its enactment, he explained that there is no ‘logical con-
tradiction between this time-limited validity of a thetic norm and its time-un-
limited truth-value’33 because the ‘thetic norm is valid under certain temporal 
conditions which limit its validity, but it is a true sentence about certain time 
conditions. Compliance with these conditions ends and the truth-value does 
not change.’34 This view appears to repeat the Wahrheitsbegriff argument that 
a sentence must have meaning as well as a logical value independent of the 
context of its use.
The second thesis, the formulation of which can be found in Znamierow- 
ski’s reflections on the independence of thinking (logic) from mental states, 
in the opening pages of his dissertation, concerns logical relations between 
sentences, which hold independently of the will. It can be noted that the con-
ception of norms developed in the Prolegomena, proceeding from the analysis 
of an isolated norm and leading to the concept of the system of norms (układ 
norm), is based primarily on the recognition that there is a logical relationship 
holding between the norms belonging to the system. As Znamierowski pointed 
out, ‘the logical connection between the content of two norms may entail that 
along with the enactment of one, the other becomes valid, although it had not 
been subject to special enactment. [...] This case demonstrates that there can 
be a relationship between norms that connects them, even independently of 
our will, into one whole. We call this whole a system of norms’.35
It can be assumed that another positive feature of Znamierowski’s anti- 
-psychologism is the above-mentioned formation of his views on social ontolo-
gy, and perhaps even the formation of his sociologism in reaction to excessive 
psychologism. However, these views are not discussed here because at the 
stage of working on Wahrheitsbegriff Znamierowski had not yet started to 
develop his conception of social ontology. In Section V, however, I will mention 
the problem of apriorism related to the justification of claims with respect to 
his later social ontology. Still, there are many indications that at the begin-
ning of his intellectual journey, Znamierowski, as a novice philosopher, had 
already held those seminal beliefs which were to have impact on the key the-
ses of his later theory and philosophy of law.
IV. THREE VERSIONS OF  
THE PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO TRUTH
Another group of issues raised by Znamierowski in Wahrheitsbegriff con-
cerns the problem of truth criteria. The slogan of classical pragmatism as-
serts that the truth of a sentence lies in its consequences. Yet how should 
33 Znamierowski (1934): 37.
34 Znamierowski (1934): 38.
35 Znamierowski (1947/1948): 38. Emphasis added.
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these consequences be understood: are they a fact, or a proposition? If these 
consequences have any use, is it practical or theoretical? Starting from such 
questions, Znamierowski distinguishes three model versions of pragmatism 
according to their respective attitudes towards truth:36 trivial, moral and sci-
entific pragmatism.
1. Trivial pragmatism
‘Truth has practical consequences’: this phrase captures Znamierowski’s 
first interpretation of the pragmatist truth criteria. If this statement is un-
derstood in such a way that the truth-value of propositions is associated 
with some practical consequences which, however, do not constitute the very 
truth-value of these propositions, the formula is theoretically trivial, since 
any theory of truth can take it as its own.37 In moral and scientific prag-
matism, however, unlike in the correspondence theory, the assessment of 
a proposition, or a sentence expressing it, is postponed in order to take into 
account the relationship between the sentence and the relevant state of af-
fairs. In the light of how the correspondence theory of truth developed after 
the publication of Znamierowski’s work, the above objection loses its force to 
the extent that it can also be successfully brought against those correspond-
ence conceptions which, among other things, seek the criteria for verifying 
sentences in their logical form (early Wittgenstein) or in sentences of the 
language of science (Carnap). Whenever we use the criteria of truth, namely 
whenever we do not embrace the sceptical view that truth in the correspond-
ence theory is acriterial, the decision on the truth-value must be postponed. 
In addition, according to Znamierowski, every version of pragmatism must 
necessarily fall into infinite regress because recognition of the truth-value of 
the proposition (sentence) about consequences will require further assess-
ment in terms of consequences, and so on.38 Solving the problem of regress is, 
however, a bone of contention of all theories of knowledge, therefore this ob-
jection also seems to miss the point. Epistemology must remain content with 
the panorama of possible positions on the limits of justification, and a given 
conception of cognition must either be on the side of scepticism or deny it, 
by choosing some version of internalism or externalism.39 It is also possible, 
though both early and contemporary pragmatists did not adopt a common 
stance on this issue, to recognize the value of regress as an expression of the 
endless process of acquiring true beliefs.
36 In his dissertation, Znamierowski discusses moral pragmatism and scientific pragmatism 
while his arguments include one more type of pragmatism which I call ‘trivial’ for lack of a better 
description.
37 See Znamierowski (1912): 31.
38 See Znamierowski (1912): 32–33.
39 The most comprehensive review to date of positions regarding the solution of the problem 
of infinite regress in theory of knowledge can be found in Armstrong (1973): 150–161.
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2. Moral pragmatism
Moral pragmatism, as interpreted by Znamierowski, claims that ‘truth 
lies in practical consequences’ broadly understood, that is covering all Lebens- 
interessen.40 Referring to the views expressed by James in The Will to 
Believe, Znamierowski ascribes to pragmatists the identification of practi-
cal consequences with external action which is useful in a moral sense. He 
finds an example of such an identification in the pragmatist justification of 
religious beliefs or science. According to Znamierowski, under the criterion of 
moral evaluation adopted by pragmatists, cognitive access to utility, and the 
choice which the pragmatist is forced to make between the perspective of an 
individual and the perspective of humanity, remain debatable. If, he argues, 
a pragmatist comes to the conclusion that there is a conflict between the con-
sidered interests of the same individual, that pragmatist will be forced either 
to make an arbitrary choice or to adopt some absolute point of view, and thus 
abandon pragmatism. The criterion of utility from the perspective of an indi-
vidual turns out to be uncertain, and surely does not give rise to permanent 
and intersubjective judgments about the truth-value of sentences. If, on the 
other hand, one considers the interests of humanity, two doubts arise. If ‘the 
interests of humanity must be represented in every human being so that they 
are truly valid at all times,’41 they either form a special group of interests 
whose determination would be arbitrary, or they involve the interest of every-
one, which in turn is impossible to determine. When writing Wahrheitsbegriff, 
Znamierowski underestimated the social conditions of the criteria of truth, 
somewhat treating this issue as zero-one: either the criteria of truth are exclu-
sively social, or they should be sought exclusively outside the world of social 
interaction. Admittedly, such an approach was reinforced by the vagueness of 
the social science terminology of the era. For instance, André Lalande, a Dur-
kheimian extensively cited by Znamierowski, uses the vague terminology of 
social tendencies or instincts in his criticism of pragmatism.42
3. Scientific pragmatism
Znamierowski gives the name of scientific pragmatism to a pragmatism 
which differs from moral pragmatism by interpreting practicality and utility, 
concepts characteristic of moral pragmatism, as ‘being rich in scientific conse-
quences, useful for theory-building and the like’ rather than as ‘being desirable 
from a moral point of view’. The key formula of such a pragmatism, ascribed to 
James, Schiller and Dewey, would be ‘The truth is in theoretical consequences.’43 
Schiller also captures this concisely: ‘what is useful in building science, is 
true’.44 On this conception, the function of truth is economy and simplification 
40 See Znamierowski (1912): 36 f.
41 Znamierowski (1912): 45.
42 Lalande (1908).
43 See Znamierowski (1912): 50.
44 Schiller (1907): 154.
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in the scientific processing of facts and the corresponding sentences. According 
to Znamierowski, scientific pragmatism shares this functional approach with 
the empiriocriticism of Mach and Avenarius, who in the late nineteenth cen-
tury paved the way for logical positivism and conventionalism (in Poincaré’s 
version45). For Znamierowski, such conceptions of truth are relativist: since if 
the consequences of judgments which are desirable from some point of view 
are taken into account as a criterion of truth, then not all judgments are taken 
into account, but only those that are selected.46
However, Znamierowski’s doubts can be aligned with other questions. 
Since constructivism in science is inevitable, would it be possible to put experi- 
ence into a meaningful whole without accepting the theoretical character of 
observation? Can any universal hypothesis be justified otherwise than merely 
to some extent, and isn’t a scientist always forced to discriminate between 
hypotheses? Pragmatists seem to say that the best measure of our belief is 
the propensity to act, based on a given hypothesis. Znamierowski is not able 
to undermine this position, but he focuses instead on the ambiguities or ob-
vious errors of selected pragmatists. For example, he accuses Dewey of psy-
chologism because he deals with the actual genesis of judgments leading to 
justified beliefs, while according to Znamierowski those judgments should be 
divided into those whose certainty imposes itself on the basis of complete fac-
tual accuracy (vollkommene Uebereinstimmung mit dem Sachverhalte) and 
those that are provisional and arbitrary.47 However, Znamierowski does not 
provide methods for distinguishing the judgments belonging to the first class. 
James, in turn, is accused of succumbing to psychologism in the intellectual-
ist version, at least with regard to necessary truths that are directly availa-
ble to cognition, which he distinguishes from provisional judgments that are 
not yet verified by means of their consequences.48 Znamierowski holds that 
such a duality within the category of ‘mental ideas’ undermines James’s con-
sequentialism: if pragmatists recognize some truths without verifying their 
consequences, then the consequentialist criterion of truth proves to be unnec-
essary. However, as pointed out above, Znamierowski himself is in favour of 
a similar differentiation of judgments into those that are considered true and 
those that have the nature of hypotheses, and the only difference between 
him and the pragmatists lies in the accepted conditions of truth. Pragmatists 
essentially declare themselves to be epistemological consequentialists, while 
Znamierowski’s scattered comments are rather indicative of a preference for 
empiricism, as he distinguishes the issues of the scientific cognitive value of 
judgments from the issues of their truth value, and a strong inclination for 
anti-psychologism.
45 Poincaré, in his works published in the beginning of the twentieth century, postulated 
the replacement of the a priori structure of space and time with arbitrarily chosen measurement 
conventions imposed on a given experience. See Grobler (2008): 268–269.
46 See Znamierowski (1912): 52.
47 Znamierowski (1912): 57.
48 See Znamierowski (1912): 60–62.
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V. THE JUSTIFICATION OF CLAIMS  
IN ZNAMIEROWSKI’S THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: 
BETWEEN EMPIRICISM AND APRIORISM
Znamierowski’s analysis of trivial, moral and scientific pragmatisms as 
accounts of truth possibly led him to seeing the problems associated with the 
justification of judgments and setting the limits for extending this justification 
in time. His dissatisfaction with the requirement of waiting for the conditions 
of justification to be met, leads to a kind of epistemological impatience in his 
efforts to dispel the infinite regress of our justifications. Such an attitude to 
justification issues might have brought about a mixture of empiricism and 
apriorism,49 which was characteristic of his later research program. The un-
ambiguous qualification of Znamierowski as an empiricist has already been 
convincingly questioned, along with the unclear methodological status of his 
a priori claims.50
Znamierowski did indeed take an a priori position on various issues, 
which he most clearly expressed for the first time in a 1921 text on social 
objects and social facts. The task he set for social ontology was to ‘establish 
general truths regarding all social entities, both existing and possible, […] 
as an a priori science […]’.51 Methodological apriorism enabled Znamierow- 
ski to identify the social entities that happened to be fundamental for his – 
and his students’ – theory and philosophy of law, such as the ‘construction 
norm’ and ‘thetic act’.52 Later, although he would still use the results of his 
a priori findings, he would associate a priori statements almost exclusively 
with analytical ones.53
On the other hand, along with the development of his scientific concep-
tions, Znamierowski’s orientation was more and more determined by empir-
icism, and even sensualism and physicalism. As Czepita observed, since the 
mid-1920s he was inclined to the view that ‘all reasonable claims about reality 
must be based directly or indirectly on sensory experience.’54 Later, under the 
influence of Kotarbiński’s reism, he adopted a reductionist understanding of 
things as ‘bodies in the physical sense’.55
In 1930, Znamierowski laid out his conception of ‘individualizing reduc-
tion’.56 The conception required that scientific statements about a communi-
ty, group or collectivity should be synonymous with a certain set of sentences, 
including both empirical sentences about the observational properties of 
49 With all ambiguities associated with the philosophical entanglement of apriorism, it is 
basically about independence from experience.
50 See Czepita (1988): 16–17.
51 Znamierowski (1921): 2.
52 More on thetic entities, see Lorini (2010): 21–30.
53 See Czepita (1988): 17, note 11.
54 Czepita (1988): 17.
55 Znamierowski (1957): 24.
56 See Znamierowski (1947–1948): 211 f.
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members of a given group, community or collectivity and, among other things, 
a priori sentences that characterize the thetic structure of that community, 
group or collectivity. This double requirement exemplifies Znamierowski’s 
tendency to combine the empirical paradigm of neopositivist sociology with 
anti-positivist threads, both conventionalist and those open to empirically 
non-verifiable apriorism.57 The ‘individualizing reduction’ also reflects his dis-
cussion of moral pragmatism58 in Wahrheitsbegriff in which he attempted to 
solve the problem of taking into account both the social perspective of the in-
dividual member of any social group and the perspective of the group to which 
that individual belongs.
Epistemological impatience, revealed for the first time in Wahrheitsbe-
griff, was to resonate in Znamierowski’s general methodology of opting for the 
reduction of temporal conditions for the justification of epistemic claims. Both 
of his favourite types of justificatory claims, namely the collection of empirical 
sense data and the postulates (postulation = thoughts ideas) of ontological 
modalities, are the shortest, albeit unconvincing, ways to construct justified 
scientific or philosophical claims and the easiest ways to avoid infinite regress.
VI. REALISM – SCIENTISM – DOGMATISM
The last part of Znamierowski’s dissertation is occupied with the problem 
of applying pragmatist concepts of truth to such issues in science as objective 
reality and scientific method. Most of his considerations contain criticism of 
the pragmatist method, in connection with its underlying conception of truth, 
and – which may seem paradoxical, if one considers Znamierowski’s opposit- 
ion to consequentialism – the consequences of being pragmatist.
The first issue discussed by Znamierowski is the fundamental attitude of 
pragmatism to reality. Znamierowski, limiting his considerations to episte-
mology, assumes that the objective reality which is the object of cognition is 
primal and given prior to knowledge about it.59 His objection to pragmatists 
concerns their treatment of scientific hypotheses as true beliefs about reality, 
‘creating reality by formulating hypotheses’ and ‘creating truth’.60 Znamiero-
wski’s cursory argument boils down to a common-sensical rejection of ‘dogma-
tism’ as a stance which illegitimately confuses knowledge with faith.61
In fact, the claim that we create the truth, and not discover it, can be found 
in the writings of James, Dewey and Schiller.62 On the other hand, James 
57 For a supportive interpretation of this methodologically eclectic conception, see Czepita 
(1987): 70.
58 See Section IV.2.
59 See Znamierowski (1912): 69–70.
60 Znamierowski (1912: 70): ‘[...] das Gemachtwerden der Wirklichkeit durch die Ausbildung 
der Hypothesen.’
61 Znamierowski (1912: 73): ‘Vermengung des Wissens und Glaubens.’
62 For references to the pragmatist’s writings, see Haack (2018): 1072.
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declared in The Will to Believe that ‘in our dealing with objective nature we 
obviously are recorders, not makers of truth’.63 Meanwhile, it seems quite obvi-
ous that Znamierowski’s criticism alludes to the views from The Will to Believe 
in a manner similar to positivism’s attempts to discredit the truth of religious 
faith, but with the aim of discrediting the pragmatist views of scientific method. 
To extrapolate from the young James’s views which were directed against the 
theses of Victorian Scientists on religion, to the philosopher’s overall views on 
science, shows that Znamierowski was still immature at that time. He should 
have noticed that even in The Will to Believe the rejection of the idea that sci-
entific evidence forms the only basis for beliefs is subject to strict conditions.64 
First, James attempts to show that the protocols of science are not universally 
applicable to beliefs. He adds: ‘The rules of the scientific game, burdens of 
proof, presumptions, experimenta crucis, complete inductions, and the like, 
are only binding on those who enter that game.65 There are cases when a be-
lief without proper grounds may be considered justified, due to favourable 
consequences, especially when a certain option is vital in life or intellectually 
undecidable. Second, according to James, also in science, belief in the truth 
of the judgment is sometimes necessary for that judgment to be confirmed. 
Znamierowski’s ranting about the pragmatists’ dogmatism is at least a dou-
ble-edged sword since it implies that true beliefs can only be based on scien-
tific grounds. This is precisely the ‘dogma’ which James rejects as limiting our 
thoughts and actions.
In Wahrheitsbegriff Znamierowski is already a self-declared realist, but 
his realism is still ‘reactionary’, as a result primarily of his polemic temper and 
positivist scientism. An in-depth affirmation of realism and reading James’s 
writings could have led Znamierowski to the insight that the author of Prag-
matism attempted to build a nuanced version of realism. Classical pragma-
tism probably was not able to arouse Znamierowski’s sympathy, but he should 
have noted that the problem of the consequences of the truth in James’s and 
Schiller’s pragmatism, in particular the consequences implying variability in 
the logical value of judgments or sentences, had already been raised by Peirce 
in James’s time. What Znamierowski attacked in Wahrheitsbegriff was the 
most common ideas of pragmatism. In particular, he opposed the so-called 
instrumental pragmatism, that is, the classical pragmatist conception of the 
truth of judgments which treated true judgments as if they were tools that can 
have a better or worse use, on a par with other judgments available in a given 
situation and with regard to an agent’s desires or goals.66 Robert Brandom 
notes that it is a mistake to treat instrumental pragmatism as a position on 
the truth of judgments rather than a position on the meaning of sentences. Ac-
cording to Brandom, classical pragmatism’s insight was that ‘the contentful-
ness of intentional states such as belief should be understood in terms of the 
63 James (1897): 20.
64 For a detailed discussion of James’s argument, see Kawalec (2010): 284–287.
65 James (1897): 93.
66 See Brandom (2011): 16.
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contribution they make to what the believers do.’67 In this context, equating 
the success of such actions with the truth of judgments, as Znamierowski did, 
is optional and susceptible to legitimate criticism.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Having defended and published his doctoral dissertation in philosophy, 
Znamierowski abandoned further research on pragmatism.68 Through dealing 
with pragmatism at the early stage of his work, he developed the founda-
tions of his own conceptions in the philosophy and theory of law. His polemic 
against this movement, which was only partially effective, reinforced his own 
views on logic, and in particular on the problem of the logical value of sentences. 
Joining sides with the enemies of psychologism, he blamed the pragmatists 
for a ‘psychologist fallacy’ based on conflating objective causes or the rules of 
logic with subjective reasons, but without noticing that the dichotomy of logic 
and psychology was problematic for the pragmatists.69 The above reflections 
on Wahrheitsbegriff with regard to logic show the founding insight, hitherto 
unknown, of Znamierowski’s anti-psychologism in the philosophy of law. They 
also provide a deeper explanation of the dualism in his theory of legal norms, 
to which he ascribed both truth-value and validity, independent of one another. 
Re-reading Wahrheitsbegriff with a focus on its author’s epistemological oscil-
lation between empiricism and apriorism may also supply an indirect under-
standing of the origins of his objectivist social ontology, and of such theoretical 
concepts as ‘construction norm’ and ‘thetic act’.
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Buczyńska-Garewicz, H. (1973). James. Warsaw.
67 Brandom (2011): 16.
68 Even though he was sometimes considered a ‘pragmatist’, it was only in the colloquial sense 
of the term. For example, Zygmunt Perz argued that Znamierowski’s assessment of the value 
of religion in relation to universal kindness, and therefore to morality, was purely pragmatic. See 
Perz (1966): 158, 161. Similarly, in his socio-political writings, as Janusz Ziółkowski noted, Zna-
mierowski advocates ‘national social engineering’ and follows a ‘directive of national pragmatism’. 
See Ziółkowski (1987): 18. The cited expressions can be found in Znamierowski (1938).
69 For more on the issue, see the texts contributed to Calcaterra, Dreon (2017).
Maciej Dybowski38
Calcaterra, R.M., Dreon, R. (eds.) (2017). Pragmatism and psychologism. European Journal of 
Pragmatism and American Philosophy 9(1).
Czepita, S. (1987). Czesława Znamierowskiego koncepcja „redukcji indywidualizującej”. Ruch 
Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny 49(3): 63–73.
Czepita, S. (1988). Koncepcje teoretycznoprawne Czesława Znamierowskiego. Poznań.
Godden, D.M. (2005). Psychologism in the logic of John Stuart Mill: Mill on the subject matter and 
foundations of ratiocinative logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 26(2): 115–143.
Grobler, A. (2008). Metodologia nauk. Kraków.
Haack, S. (2018). The pragmatist tradition: lessons for legal theorists. Washington University 
Law Review 95(5): 1049–1082.
Ingarden, R. (1963). Z badań nad filozofią współczesną. Dzieła filozoficzne. Volume 6. Warsaw.
James, W. (1897). The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. New York.
James, W. (1907). Pragmatism, a New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking: Popular Lectures 
on Philosophy. New York.
Judycki, S. (1993). Co to jest fenomenologia? Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria 2(1): 25–38.
Kawalec, P. (2010). Woluntaryzm epistemologiczny Williama Jamesa. Próba rekonstrukcji na 
gruncie probabilizmu B. van Fraassena. Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria 19(4): 283–295.
Kołakowski, L. (2000). Kultura i fetysze. Warsaw.
Lalande, A. (1908). Pragmatisme, humanisme, et vérité. Revue Philosophique de la France et de 
l’Étranger 65: 1–26.
Lorini, G. (2010). Ontologia społeczna Czesława Znamierowskiego. Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomicz-
ny i Socjologiczny 72(4): 21–30.
Lorini, G., Żełaniec, W. (2016). Czesław Znamierowski’s social ontology and its phenomenological 
roots, [in:] A. Salice, H.B. Schmid (eds.), The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality. 
History, Concepts, Problems. Cham: 75–89.
Merezhko, A.A. (2012). The mystery of a legal philosopher’s death: L.I. Petrazhitskii. Journal of 
Comparative Law 108(7): 108–114.
Meyer, M. (1908). The exact number of pragmatisms. The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and 
Scientific Methods 5: 321–326.
Perz, Z. (1966). U podstaw poglądów etycznych Czesława Znamierowskiego. Studia Philosophiae 
Christianae 2(1): 135–164.
Schiller, F.C.S. (1902). Axioms as postulates, [in:] H. Sturt (ed.), Personal Idealism: Philosophical 
Essays by Eight Members of the University of Oxford. London: 47–134.
Schiller, F.C.S. (1905). The definition of ‘pragmatism’ and ‘humanism’. Mind 54(14): 235–240.
Schiller, F.C.S. (1907). Studies in Humanism. London.
Sidgwick, A. (1905). Applied axioms. Mind 14: 42–57.
Tworak, Z. (1996). Logika wobec myślenia. Nowa Krytyka 7: 73–91.
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CRITICISM OF CLASSICAL PRAGMATISM: 
THE UNKNOWN ORIGINS OF 
CZESŁAW ZNAMIEROWSKI’S THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
S u m m a r y
The article presents the key ideas of Czesław Znamierowski’s 1911 doctoral dissertation on the 
concept of truth in pragmatism (Der Wahrheitsbegriff im Pragmatismus), thus far not discussed 
in the literature, and the impact it had on some of his later ideas in the philosophy and theory of 
law. His polemic against pragmatism reinforced his later views on science and logic, and in par-
ticular on the problem of the truth-value of sentences. This founding insight of Znamierowski’s 
anti-psychologism in the philosophy of law, namely the independence of logic from mental states, 
provides a deeper explanation of a dualism in his theory of the legal norm: the ascription of both 
truth-value and validity, mutually independent, to legal norms. When analysed with regard to 
Znamierowski’s epistemological oscillation between empiricism and apriorism, Wahrheitsbegriff 
may also enable a better understanding of the origins of his objectivist social ontology and of such 
legal-theoretical concepts as ‘construction norm’ and ‘thetic act’.
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